How child labor and child schooling interact with adult labor by Ray, Ranjan
W95 ai-i'
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2179
How Child Labor and Child  The link between household
poverty and child labor is
Schooling Interact with  much  stronger  in Pakistan
than in Peru. Providing good Adult Labor  schools  in South Asia could
help reduce child labor. The
Ranjan  Ray  link between child labor and
adult labor markets  varies
with  gender.
The World Bank
Office of the Senior Vice President

















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING PAPER  2179
Summary  findings
Using data from Peruvian and Pakistani household  Rising wages for men significantly reduce the labor
surveys, Ray tests the hypotheses of a positive association  hours of Peruvian girls. Strong complementarity exists
between child labor hours and poverty and a negative  between the labor market for women and that for girls in
association between child schooling and poverty.  Pakistan.
Both hypotheses are confirmed using Pakistani data  Providing good schools in South Asia could help
but not using Peruvian data.  reduce child labor and break the strong link there
What explains these divergent results?  between poverty and hours spent in child labor.
The link between household poverty and child labor is  Data from both countries confirm the positive role
much stronger in Pakistan than in Peru - perhaps partly  more adult education can play in improving child
because Pakistani schools are not as good as those in  welfare. Adult education's impact on child labor is
Peru, and perhaps partly because Pakistani families value  considerably greater in Pakistan than in Peru. One
education less, especially for girls. Also, Peruvian  generation's  lack of skills and education causes the next
children combine schooling with employment, unlike  to remain uneducated and unskilled as well.
Pakistani children.
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There has been, in recent years, a growing interest in the subject of child labour
among academics, professionals and the media. Though the ILO (1996a)'s estimates on
labour force participation rates for children aged 10-14 years show a declining trend, in
absolute terms the size of the child labour force is and will continue to be large enough to be
of serious concern. According to the ILO, in  1990 there were almost 79 million children
around the world who did regular work [see Ashagrie (1993, p.16)]. Kebebew Ashagrie was
the first person to put together an international  data set on child labour. His figure on the size
of child labour has since been revised upwards to 120 million children between the age of 5-
14 years doing full time', paid work [ILO (1996b), Ashagrie (1998)]. The estimate of child
labour would vary depending on how we define work, 2 how we define a child, and how we
collect the data, but few would disagree that this is a problem of gigantic proportions. The
universal perception of child labour as a 'problem' stems from the widespread  belief that the
employment of  children, especially young children, has  harmful  effects, including the
destructive consequences for the child's intellectual and physical development. These are
particularly serious for children who work in hazardous industries, risking accident and
injury; there are others working in conditions  that take a slower but definite toll on the child's
health. Child labour does constrain the child's ability to benefit fully from schooling and
education,  thereby, possibly condemning  her to perpetual  poverty and low wage employment.
Moreover, child labour is believed by many to contribute  to adult employment in developing
countries. For example,  an enquiry into child labour by the ILO observes, "...  child labour is
a cause of and may even contribute to adult unemployment and low wages" [ILO (1988,
p.90)]. The trade lobby in the developed countries has further argued that child labour in
' If one includes part time work as well, then the ILO (1996b)  estimate goes up to 250 million working children.
2 In this paper, we follow the ILO definition of child labour  [see Ashagrie (1993)] in classifying a child as a
'labourer' if the child does full time, paid work. While this limits  our analysis to only a subset of child work, it
makes our study comparable  with others in the literature.
1developing countries gives them an unfair cost advantage  in international  trade, and that this
constitutes a form of "protection"  requiring corrective  international  action. For example, in a
study of child labour in India's carpet industry, Levison, et al (1996) found that "there is a
competitive cost advantage to hiring child labour with its magnitude relatively small for
industrialised country sellers and consumers but relatively large for poor loom enterprise
owners".
Notwithstanding almost universal agreement that child labour is undesirable, there is
wide  disagreement on how to  tackle this problem. This  partly stems from the lack of
awareness of, let alone consensus on, the causes of child labour, and the consequences of
banning it through legislation. There has, however, been in recent years a rapidly expanding
literature on Child Labour. 3 While some of these studies [for example, Knight (1980), Horn
(1995)] discussed mainly the qualitative features of child labour, the recent literature has
focussed attention on the quantitative aspects taking advantage of the increasing availability
of good quality data on child employment. Within the empirical literature on child labour,
there has been a shift in emphasis from mere quantification  to an econometric analysis of its
determinants. This has coincided with a widespread realisation that simply banning child
labour is unlikely to eradicate this phenomenon and may even be counterproductive. As
Knight (1980, p.17) notes, "when child labour is prohibited by law, the law cannot protect
child workers since they legally do not exist". An understanding of the key determinants of
child labour is necessary for formulation of effective policies in reducing and eventually
eliminating child labour. This view underlines the recent econometric analyses of  child
labour on micro data sets of developing countries.  These studies had, earlier, mostly involved
Latin American data on child labour, but, recently, they have extended to data sets of African
and Asian countries. Examples include the studies of Psacharopoulos (1997), Cartwright and
See Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), Basu (1998) for surveys.
2Patrinos (1998) on Bolivian data, Grootaert (1998) on Cote d'Ivoire, Tienda (1979), Boyden
(1988,  1991), Patrinos  and Psacharopoulos (1997) on  Peru,  Psacharopoulos (1997) on
Venezuela, Salazar (1988) on Colombia, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995) on Paraguay,
Myers (1989) on South American survey data, Bonnet (1993) on Africa as a whole, Jensen
and Nielsen (1997) on Zambia, Addison, et al (1997) on Pakistan and Ghana, Chaudhuri
(1997) on India, Diamond and Fayed (1998) on Egypt, and Ray (1988) on Pakistani and
Peruvian data. 4
The chief motivation of this paper is two fold:
(a)  it examines on Peruvian and Pakistani data the key determinants of child
labour hours and of the share of child and adult earnings in the household's
total  earnings, focussing attention  on  the  similarities  and  dissimilarities
between the Peruvian and Pakistani results. This study, hence, extends Ray
(1998) which analysed  child labour force participation,  rather than child labour
hours and, unlike here, restricted attention to child employment, and did not
include adult labour earnings in the analysis. Moreover, the present study
overcomes a  significant limitation of our earlier analysis in  estimating the
child labour hours equations separately  for boys and for girls.
(b)  it extends the model of child labour introduced in Basu and Van (1998) by
allowing a differential labour market interaction between child and adult male
labour on one hand, and child and adult female labour on the other. The need
to make this distinction stems from the key empirical result, discussed later,
that the nature of interaction  between adult male and child labour markets may
be different from that between adult female and child labour markets. The
importance of this distinction is sharpened by  the fact that the nature of
responsiveness of child labour hours to adult wage changes is quite different
between the Peruvian and Pakistani data sets. The case for distinguishing 5
between male and female labour in their interaction with child labour can be
traced to Grant and Hamermesh (1981) who found that youths and white
women were substitutes, while youths and white men were complements in
production in the US.
Another significant motivation of the present study is a text of the Luxury Axiom
introduced by Basu and Van (1998, p.4 16). This Axiom has been stated by them as follows:
4 See,  also,  the  volumes  edited  by  Bequele  and  Boyden  (1988),  Myers  (1991),  and  Grootaert  and  Patrinos
(1998).
S  see Diamond  and Fayed  (1998)  for more  recent  evidence  in  fervour  of the distinction  between  male and
female  labour.  Note,  also,  that  each  of the case  studies  in  the recent  volume  edited  by Grootaert  and  Patrinos
(1998)  recognises  this distinction.  I am  grateful  to the referee  for  drawing  this  volume  to my attention.
3Lulxury  Axiom:  A family will send the children to the labour market only if the family's
income from non-child-labour  sources drops very low.
In view of the key role that this Axiom, along with others, plays in Basu and Van's
analysis of child labour, an empirical evaluation of it is of some policy significance. The
result of our test will throw light on the important question of whether poverty is the key
determinant of child labour, as is widely believed to be. The use of more than one country's
data is a good way to test for the universalism of this axiom, since what may be empirically
true for one country need not be so for another. The choice of Peruvian and Pakistani data
sets, which was made with considerable  care, was dictated by principally two considerations:
(a)  In view of the LSMS involvement in each case, the structure and coverage of these
data sets are sufficiently  similar to allow meaningful  comparisons  between them.
(b)  These countries provide an  interesting comparison because of their  geographical
distance from each other, besides their cultural, economic and demographic diversity.
For example, the per capita GNP in Peru is more than twice that of Pakistan,  while its
population size is only a fifth of the latter. 6 The two countries also differ sharply in
family size, in household composition between boys and girls, and in the educational
experience and work practice of its women and children.
Child labour takes different form in different regions. Cross country comparisons,
especially involving  different cultures  and  continents, enable  better  understanding of
differences in  the policies required to  maximise their  effectiveness in  specific regional
contexts. We observe some interesting dissimilarities  between the results of the Peruvian and
Pakistani regressions. The most significant of these is the fact that the nature of interrelation
between the adult male, adult female and child labour markets is sharply different between
the two countries.
We also examine the role of community  infrastructure  by including some community
variables in  the  estimating regressions. The estimates allow an  interesting comparison
6 See Lancaster, Ray and Valenzuela  (1999, Table 3).
4between countries on the impact of community  infrastructure  on child labour hours and child
schooling. The results  are  of  considerable practical significance since the  community
variables provide potential instruments in  devising effective polices that  improve child
welfare.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data sets, and
compares some relevant child variables between Peru and Pakistan. Section 3 contains the
results of  estimating the child  labour supply and child  schooling equations. Section 4
discusses the analytical  implication of these results by distinguishing  between adult male and
adult female in  a  model of  child labour. Section 5 summarises the principal findings,
discusses the possible implications  and suggests directions for further research.
2.  The Data Sets and their Principal Features
The  child  labour  data  for  the  study  came  from  the  Peru  Living  Standards
Measurement Survey in 1994 (PLSS) and the Pakistan  Integrated Household Survey in 1991
(PIHS). These surveys were conducted jointly by the respective governments and the World
Bank as part of the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys  in a
number of developing countries. The purpose of the LSMS surveys is to provide policy
makers and researchers with individual, household and community level data needed to
analyse the impact of policy initiatives on living standards of households. The Pakistan
Integrated Household Survey covered 4800 households, while the Peru Living Standards
Survey involved 3623 households.  While the Peruvian sample contained information  on child
labour and child schooling of 5231 children aged 6-17 years, the Pakistani data set yielded
5867 observations on children aged 10-17 years. Some of these observations could not be
used, however, because of poor quality. The construction of child wage data involved the
' See Grosh and Glewwe (1995) for an overview and general description of the LSMS data sets.
5combination of income and work information from a number of sources. The wage and
labour hours relate to children involved in full time labour pursuits outside the home, and
receiving direct or indirect cash payments for their labour. The wages of  children, who
worked on their family farm, were calculated from the information  on farm income and on
the  corresponding adult, child  labour hours contained in  the  surveys. Since a  central
motivation of this exercise is to investigate the economic determinants of child labour, for
example, the household's poverty status and, especially, child wages, we do not consider in
the substantive  part of this study, child work that involves  purely household chores nor do we
study  other  forms  of  child  labour  that  do  not  attract,  explicitly  or  implicitly, cash
remuneration. This limits the scope of our analysis somewhat,  but makes  this study consistent
with the  ILO definition of  child labour which identifies it with  "economically active"
children [see Ashagrie (1993)]. In case of Peru, which does not provide information on child
hours spent on unpaid domestic work, we, therefore, utilised the entire available information
on child labour. In case of Pakistan, while boys were assumed to be not involved in domestic
work by the survey designers,  household chores accounted,  on average, for over 90% of girls'
total labour hours. We, therefore, investigate in the latter part of this study the sensitivity of
our results to  the recognition "of unpaid, domestic hours as child labour in  the case of
Pakistani girls for whom such information  was available.
Tables 1, 2 present the age specific participation rates of Peruvian and Pakistani
children in the labour market and in schooling. The following remarks apply. First, in both
countries, child labour participation rates increase with child age. In case of schooling,
however, while the enrolment of Peruvian children peaks around 13 years, in Pakistan the
rate peaks earlier at 11 years, and falls continuously  to alarmingly low levels, especially for
older girls. Second, the gender picture is similar between the two countries with respect to
child labour. In case of child schooling,  however, the strong gender disparity in the Pakistani
6sample contrasts sharply with a more even gender balance in the Peruvian case. Third, the
schooling participation rates of Peruvian children in all age groups are consistently higher
than their Pakistani counterparts.
The figures on school enrolment rates reflect the lack of good schools in Pakistan,
compared to Peru. As Basu (1998, p.9,10) points out, "even the mere availability of good-
quality schooling can do a lot" in reducing child labour. Moreover, strict Islamic laws that
keep women at home, possibly, explain the sharp fall in the school enrolment rate of older
Pakistani girls, especially in the age groups 11-16  years. Table 2 shows that, in the age group
11-16 years, the employment and  school enrolment rates of  Pakistani boys move quite
sharply in opposite directions, thus, suggesting that, unlike Peruvian children, they drop out
of schooling completely to enter the labour market. This is consistent with the observation of
Weiner (1996) on Indian child labour: "most of the 90 million children not in school are
working children". It is, incidentally,  worth noting that some of Weiner's "working children"
are not included as child labourers  in the present study because they do not receive wages. 8
Further comparisons between key characteristics in the two data sets can be made
from the sample means presented in Table 3. The following points are worth noting. First, a
typical Pakistani household contains more children than the Peruvian family. Second, on
poverty lines defined as 50% of sample median of non child equivalent household income,
the figures on the percentage of children living in poverty are seen to  be  quite similar
between the two  countries. If we include child earnings in the household income, these
figures fall to  29.26 (boys), 29.00 (girls) for  Peru, and 23.41 (boys), 23.68  (girls) for
Pakistan. This points to the small but perceptible contribution made by children to pulling
households out  of poverty, with this  contribution being somewhat larger in the case of
Pakistani children. Third, in relation to Peru, the proportion of Pakistani children who have
8  Cartwright and Patrinos (1998), for example, classify child workers who do not attend school and are not
formally employed as "home care workers".
7never attended schooling is alarmingly high. Fourth, the gender disparity in the educational
experience of Pakistani children, observed earlier, holds in case of their adults as well. On
average, the most educated female in the Pakistani household has only 39% of the schooling
experience of the adult male compared to the corresponding figure of 89% in the Peruvian
household. The educational deprivation of the adult female in Pakistan is further reflected in
the fact that, unlike in Peru, she has experienced much less schooling  than her child. Fourth,
in relation to the adult male, the female works much less hours in outside paid employment  in
Pakistan compared to Peru. This feature, which reflects Islamic laws that constrain the
female's outside work involvement,  is reflected in the much higher ratio of the child's labour
hours to that of the female in Pakistan than in Peru. Such wide disparities between some of
the key characteristics  of the two country samples  justify the choice of these two data sets as
discussed earlier.
Table 4 compares the earnings shares of men, women and children between the two
countries. The Peruvian adult female contributes a  much larger share of the household
earnings than  the  Pakistani  female. This  is  consistent  with  the  comparable sample
characteristics,  presented in Table 3, especially the fact that females are much less educated
in relation to the male in Pakistan than in Peru and, hence, have much less earning power. It
is also interesting to note the much higher dependence  of the household on child earnings in
Pakistan than in Peru. The child in Pakistan lags only marginally behind the adult female in
her/his share of household earnings. This largely explains the result, presented and discussed
later, that commercially paid, child labour hours are much more responsive to household
poverty in Pakistan than in Peru.
83.  Estimation  Method and Empirical Results
The estimation method was based on the two step procedure, discussed in Maddala
(1983,  Sec.  6.11),  for  estimating labour supply equations after  correcting for  sample
selectivity. The results were obtained using the LIMDEP programme written by Greene
(1995, p.653-659) which implements this procedure. We ensured that the child labour and
child schooling equations,  that were estimated, are pure reduced form equations with none of
the variables on the right hand side likely to suffer from endogeneity.
Table  5,  6 present the estimates of the  coefficients of  the selectivity corrected
regressions in  Peru  and  Pakistan, respectively, of  child  labour hours  on  the  various
determinants.  Keeping in mind the possibility that the supply of child labour depends on the
gender of the child, these tables report the results of separate estimation of child labour hours
for boys and girls. Since a key motivation of our exercise is a test of Basu and Van (1998)'s
Luxury Axiom, the poverty status of a household was defined with respect to a poverty line
that is set at 50% of the sample median of the distribution of per adult equivalent non child
household income.
The following features are worth noting from the tables.
(i)  Peru and Pakistan disagree on the validity of the Luxury Axiom. The estimated
coefficient of the poverty variable is weak and statistically insignificant for
both child sexes in Peru, but quite the reverse in Pakistan. A previously non
poor Pakistani household will increase the outside, paid employment of its
children quite substantially,  namely, by approximately 500 child labour hours
annually for each child, if it goes below the poverty line, exactly as predicted
by the Luxury Axiom. The reverse is indicated for Peru. This mixed response
to a test of the Luxury Axiom between Peru and Pakistan is consistent with our
earlier observation that Pakistani children, especially boys, play a greater role
in pulling households out of poverty than Peruvian children. The Pakistani
result, though not the Peruvian one, appears to contradict the observation of
Bhatty (1998)  who cites a variety of empirical studies on Indian child labour in
support of the view that "income and related  variables do not seem to have any
direct significant effect on children's work input". However, as we report
below, this contradiction is partly resolved and the evidence in favour of the
Luxury Axiom weakens in case of Pakistani girl labour if  we extend the
definition  of child labour to include domestic work.
9(ii)  Other  interesting comparisons may  be  made  between the  Peruvian and
Pakistani results. The insignificance of the coefficient of the squared age
variable suggests a linear relationship between child labour hours and child
age in both countries. However, unlike in Peru, there is a sizeable gender
differential in favour of boys in Pakistan, on the magnitude of  impact of
increasing age on a child's labour supply.  Note, however, that this differential
may be more apparent than real, since older girls in Pakistan are likely to be
increasingly involved in unpaid domestic work, which we have not considered
in the child labour estimations  reported so far.
(iii)  Ceteris Paribus, in both countries and in case of both sexes, urban children
work less hours than their rural counterpart,  possibly, reflecting  the importance
of rural farm employment as a destination of child labour in these primarily
agricultural countries. It is interesting  to note, however, that in absolute terms,
while the estimated coefficient of the Region of residence variable for girl
labour exceeds that of boys in Peru, the reverse is indicated for Pakistan.
(iv)  While both countries agree on the positive role that increasing education of the
adults in the household plays in reducing both boys' and girls' child labour,
these effects are much stronger in both size and significance in Pakistan than
in  Peru.  Moreover, the  community variables, generally, exert significant
impact on child labour hours, with the estimated coefficients, mostly but not
always, having the expected sign. For example,  a deterioration in the sewerage
disposal system sharply increases girl labour hours in Pakistan and, for both
sexes, child labour hours in  Peru, but  reduces the boys'  labour hours in
Pakistan. The significant impact of community variables on child labour is
confirmed  by  the  rejection  of  the  joint  hypothesis  of  no  community
infrastructure  effects in all the cases reported in Tables 5, 6.
(v)  Without exception, child labour hours respond positively and significantly to
child wage. Of particular interest in these regression results are the estimated
coefficients of  the adult  wage variables, for  they  indicate the  nature  of
interaction between  the  child  and  adult  labour  markets.  The  estimated
coefficients differ in  sign  and  magnitude both  between child  sexes  and
between countries. In Peru, increasing adult wages reduce child labour in case
of both boys and girls, thereby, suggesting  that child and adult labour hours are
substitutes in that country. In contrast, rising female wages sharply increase
the labour hours of Pakistani girls, but have negligible impact on the labour
hours of Pakistani boys. Note, however, that the statistical significance and
negative impact of the quadratic female wage effects in case of Pakistani girls
suggests that this relationship is non linear and weakens in the higher age
categories [see, also, Basu (1993)]. The Pakistani finding indicates that in the
absence of good schools and satisfactory day care arrangements,  if the mother
works, she has to put her child to work as well. A comparison of the estimated
coefficients of the adult wage variables in case of Pakistan shows that the
nature of interaction between the child labour market, especially that of the
girl, and that of the adult female is quite different from that between the child
and the adult male labour markets.
The reader will recall that the results presented in Tables 5, 6 relate to child labour
hours involved in full time, paid employment.  To investigate the robustness  of these results to
10a more relaxed treatment of child labour, we now go beyond the ILO definition of child
labour as "economically active" children to include child labour hours spent on domestic
work. Such information  was, however, only available for Pakistani girl labour. The results of
estimating the Pakistani girl labour equations with and without domestic duties are presented
and compared in Table 7. Two features of these results are worth mentioning.
(i)  With the inclusion of domestic duties in the definition of child labour, the
impact of poverty on a girl child's labour hours weakens sharply from 473 to
60 annual hours and the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient of
the poverty variable  disappears.  In other words, Pakistani girls fall in line with
Peruvian children in failing to find strong evidence in support of the Luxury
Axiom. Clearly, when a household falls into poverty in Pakistan, the girl child,
having to work more hours in outside, paid employment,  is able to devote less
hours on household chores. Consequently,  the overall impact of poverty on her
labour hours weakens sharply on the inclusion of domestic duties as child
labour.
(ii)  The absolute magnitude  and significance  of several of the other variables, also,
weaken sharply with the recognition  of child hours spent on household chores
as child labour. Note, however, that rising female education continues to have
a significantly negative impact on child labour hours. It is interesting to note,
however, that the impact of male education on child labour weakens sharply
and  loses its  statistical significance on the  inclusion of  domestic duties.
Similarly, the magnitude and significance of the female wage coefficients
weaken sharply on the inclusion of household work in the definition of child
labour, with the squared female wage coefficient losing its strong statistical
significance.  Note, however, that our earlier remark that the response of child
labour hours in Pakistan to changes in male wages is quite different from that
to female wage changes is robust to the alternative  definitions of child labour.
On a  likelihood ratio test,  the  community variables  continue to  have  a
significant  impact on child labour, even in the presence of domestic duties.
Tables 8, 9 present the estimated  regression coefficients  of years of child schooling on
the various determinants in the two countries.  If one extends Basu and Van (1998)'s Luxury
Axiom to the context of schooling to predict that a household will not send its children to
school if it falls into poverty, then a negative and statistically significant coefficient of the
poverty variable will provide confirmation  of this Axiom. As in the case of child labour and,
hence, consistent with the earlier results, the Peruvian  evidence on child schooling,  especially
for Peruvian girls, contradicts  the Luxury Axiom, but the Pakistan evidence confirms it. The
11latter is true of both the child sexes, especially of Pakistani girls. This provides confirmation
of our earlier observation, also noted by Weiner (1996), Basu (1998) and others, that South
Asian children, especially girls from poor households, drop out of schooling to  enter the
labour market. The lack of good schools in Pakistan  with the consequent discount  that parents
place on the value of their child's  education, possibly, explains this result. The gender
differential between the child sexes in Pakistan in this respect is quite revealing, with girls
experiencing a much sharper reduction than boys in their schooling, when their households
fall  into poverty. In  contrast to  Pakistan, Peruvian children register much smaller and
statistically insignificant changes in their schooling as they slip into poverty, with Peruvian
girls even registering a small increase. This partly reflects a much higher valuation that
Peruvian  parents place on their child's education  and, partly, the fact, as observed by Patrinos
and Psacharopulos  (1997) in their study of Peruvian child labour, that children there combine
employment with schooling to a greater extent than in other countries. As these authors
comment  (p. 398), "working actually makes it possible for the children to go to school."
Increasing education of adults have a positive effect on their children's'  schooling in
both countries. The more educated parents in both countries, especially in Pakistan, see the
value of their child's education, and resist the temptation to pull the child out of schooling
and put her/him into paid employment. Rising child wages increase the opportunity cost of
education and  significantly reduce child  schooling in  Pakistan but  have  a  statistically
insignificant impact in Peru. The close complementarity between girls' and female labour,
observed earlier in Pakistan, is consistent with the negative impact that rising female wages
there have on child schooling. In other words, when female wages rise, the working mother
tends to pull the daughter out of schooling and take the child to work alongside herself. It is
worth noting that no such relationship exists in Peru. It is, also, interesting to observe that
12girls in Pakistan, though not boys, experience  significantly  more schooling in the urban areas
than in the rural countryside.
The  regression estimates presented and  discussed in  Tables  5,  6  relate  to  the
individualistic labour supply behaviour of children in the household. This is in line with the
"collective" models of  household behaviour that  have been proposed recently [see, for
example, Alderman, et al(1995)]. While such models are attractive from a policy viewpoint,
especially since welfare analysis stems from  and  should explicitly relate to  individual
behaviour, they have one significant limitation in the current context. This follows from the
fact that the decision on a child's labour force participation  and on her hours of work, leisure
and schooling are, typically, taken by the adult, not by the child herself. The conventional
treatment of the household in the 'unitary' models may therefore be of some relevance in this
case. Moreover, the share of household earnings contributed by the adult male, the adult
female and, especially, the child, and their responsiveness  to changes in key household and
community  characteristics  are of direct policy concern.
To  provide empirical evidence on  this  issue, we  estimated the  following three
equation earnings share system:
In  n
w; =a;  +  _a  (family)j  + a  cL (community)j
j=1  j=1
3
+ yij  (wage)j +f3jK  (1)
j='
i=  1, 2, 3
where wi is earnings share of i (adult male, adult female and child), (family)j denotes the
family's jth characteristic, (community)j denotes the jtb community variable, and (wage)j
denotes the  maximum wage  attracted by  the  male,  female and  child  workers in  that
household. K is the poverty variable, as defined earlier over non child labour income, taking
the  value  1 if the  household is  below the poverty line,  0  otherwise. The 'adding  up'
13conditions, I  ai =I, I  a* =Y_  *=yjj  =I  pi =0  follow from the fact that  Ew;  =1  in
each household. To keep the calculations simple,  we have estimated only on the Pakistan  data
set, and used a selection of the household characteristics  from the previous regressions.
The results of estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 10. Let us recall from
Table 4 that, in Pakistan, on average, children contribute  to a non-trivial share (5.92%) of the
household earnings, not far below the share (8.77%) of the adult female. This points to child
labour income as a  significant source of earnings for many households in  Pakistan. The
following features follow from the Table. First, the poverty status of a household has a highly
significant impact on the earning shares of its men, women and children. When a Pakistani
household crosses the poverty line from above, ie. falls into poverty, the earnings share of its
women and children increase significantly,  at the expense  of that of its men. This reflects the
fact that poor households reside in regions with limited employment opportunities for its
male members. This, coupled with the fact that the men in such households generally  lack the
skills needed in high wage employment,  increases  the household's dependence  on female and
child earnings to pull itself out of poverty. This provides further confirmation of the Luxury
Axiom in the context of paid, full time, Pakistani child labour. Second, with increasing
education of the adult members of the household, especially of its females, the household's
dependence on child labour, as measured by the share of child earnings, falls significantly.
This is consistent with the negative impact of rising adult education on child labour hours
noted earlier. Third, rising wages of male and female members exert significantly positive
impact on their own earnings share in the household but  decrease that of  one another.
Notwithstanding the positive impact of increasing female wages on girl labour hours in
Pakistan, noted earlier, the corresponding  impact on the child's earnings share is very small
in both size and significance. Fourth, neither the region of residence, nor the community
variables have any significant impact on the earnings share of men, women and children in
14the household. Finally, female headed households, because of their higher vulnerability to
poverty, are much more dependent on adult female and child earnings than the male headed
households.
4.  Some Analytical Implications
One of the main empirical results of this study is the differential response of child
labour hours to male and female wage changes. In particular,  the positive coefficient estimate
of the impact of  female wage in  Pakistan on child labour supply would appear to  be
somewhat inconsistent with Basu and Van (1998, p.416)'s 'Luxury Axiom',  namely, that
child labour will decline if adult income rises. This inconsistency  is reinforced in the case of
Peru, but not Pakistan, by the lack of any significant  positive correlation  between child labour
and household poverty. This raises the question: does our empirical evidence show that the
Basu and Van assumption about household altruism is false or, in  other words, is their
specification of the household's objective function flawed? While this may be so, and any
conclusion must at best be considered tentative in the absence of more empirical research, it
is possible to extend the Basu and Van analysis by sticking to their objective function, but
arguing that the differential response is the consequence  of a complication  in the household's
budget constraint. In particular, we will assume what seems to be realistic in the South Asian
context,  namely,  (a)  the  norm  of  looking after  the  child  is  primarily the  mother's
responsibility, and (b) the absence of good schools and  suitable child care facilities. A
consequence  of (a) and (b) is that if a child has to stay at home, then the mother cannot go out
to work. This view leads us to the following Axiom that replaces the Luxury Axiom of Basu
and Van (1998).
Complementarity  Axiom:  From the household's point of view, in the absence of good
schools, a rise in female wages will lead to an increase in child
labour. Alternatively, in  the absence of  good schools, child
15labour responds differently  to male and female wages with the
latter correlated  positively with child employment.
To model this behaviour, we take a variant of the Basu and Van utility function as
follows:
u=(c - s) (1 - e +  6)  (2)
where c is the household's total consumption , e E [0,1] is the child's  labour supply (or
effort), so that (1 - e) is the child's leisure, and s, 6 > 0 are parameters. While s may be
thought of  as  'subsistence consumption', 6  (> 0) ensures a  positive marginal utility of
consumption of the household whether or not the child works, that is, for e = 0 and 1.
In view of the consequence of assumptions (a), (b) mentioned above, the household's
budget constraint is now given by:
c < ewc + d(e)wf +  wm  (3)
where W 0, wf and wm  are child, female and male wages, respectively, and d(e) is a dummy
variable which takes a value of 1 if e = 1, ie. if child works, 0 otherwise. The augmented
budget constraint (3) extends  that in Basu and Van to allow for the fact that the mother earns
wf if the child goes to work, and specialises  to the latter if d(e) = 1 for all e.
The household's problem is to  maximise U subject to  (3). Note now that, if the
household chooses not to let its child work, ie. e = 0, then U = (wm  - sXl  + 6) since neither
the mother nor the child will work. Alternatively, if e =1, then U = (w. + Wf  +  Wm - S>..
Hence, the child will be sent to work if:
(WC  + Wf  + Wm  -S  s2  (wm  -s)(l  +  )or, (wC  + wf )6  w.  -s  (4)
Hence, as female wage wf increases, the child increases her labour supply since (4) is more
likely to hold. Alternatively, as wm increases, the child is less likely to work. Hence, with
only  a  slight variation of the  Basu and Van objective function, the  augmented budget
16constraint easily accommodates differential  child labour supply responses to male and female
wages. Note  that  this  model is  based on the assumption of  non  availability of  decent
schooling and/or satisfactory child care. If, however, such facilities are available, then a rise
in female wage, wf, does not necessarily imply that the child will work as the Peruvian
evidence confirms, since she can be sent to school or put in day care. This may explain the
difference between the Peruvian and Pakistani results on the relationship between child
labour and female wages.
Let us now turn to the objective function itself. We consider the following CES
generalisation of the Stone Geary utility function  used by Basu and Van (1998, eqn. 13).
- 3  - I/PC1  - L3  - e  /Pe  (5)
UJ(c.,  Cf,ScC  e.,ef,e  c  )=E  k  (k  -Sk  )  +E  'k  (Tk  -tk  -k  )P'  (5)
where Ck,  Sk,  Tk, tk are, respectively, actual consumption,  subsistence  consumption, maximum
time available, minimum time required for leisure and non labour activities, and ek denotes
labour hours for the male, female and the child (k = m, f, c). (5) extends the Basu and Van
framework  in 3 ways:
(i)  it allows non zero substitution  possibilities between consumption (via pc X 0)
and between leisure (via Pe # 0), and specialises to the Stone-Geary forn  if
Pc  Pe =0.
(ii)  it disaggregates the household's aggregate consumption and labour supply
between that of male, female and child.
(iii)  in considering ek to be a quantitative variable rather than a qualitative one, it
allows analysis of the child's  labour hours, rather than simply the child's
labour force participation.
The corresponding  household budget constraint is given by
pmc. +±pfcf  +p.cc  =wmem  +wfef  +w~ct  (6)
17where pk  is the unit price of consumption of household member k (= m, f, c) and wk is the
corresponding wage rate. Maximising (5) with respect to  {Ck, ek} subject to (6) yields, on
rearranging, the following  consumption  and earnings equations.
pici  =  +ii X  -PkSk  )  (7)
i=m,  f, c
wiei =wjT; -w  it;  -I(EwkTk  -ZWktk  X)  (8)
where
I  pi (c; - S;)p'
E  Ik(ck  -Sk)P)
k
yp2_ (Tk  -P;  . e 
A  k  (Tk  tk  -ek)PC
k
x  = Ew1 e,  = Yp1 c 1 ,  ie. we assume that the household consumes  its entire earnings.
Let us now define  6, =  e,  namely, the ratio of consumption to  earnings by
household number i.  Hence, 8i >  1 implies a  net resource transfer to  i,  and 8i <  1, a
corresponding resource outflow from i. In case of the child, it is easily verified that  8, '1
according as:
(ps'  - f, lS)<  (W sTc-  _  C2T )+  (02  _  -f  )X(9
where T: = Tk -tk,  T  = Y-wk  Tk, and S =  pjs;  is the aggregate  subsistence consumption
k
in the household. (9), in turn, implies that if  2 -O, and  SZuX, then  8  '<1 according as
pcs: <  w.Tc*. Since the left hand side of this  last inequality (ie. the  child's subsistence
18consumption)  will almost certainly  be less than the right hand side (ie. the maximum earnings
that the child can bring ), 6; < 1 in this case. This leads us to the following  proposition.
Proposition: If child labour supply is inelastic with respect to aggregate household income,
then in a poor household living around the subsistence  level of consumption, child labour is
'exploitative' in the sense that the child's earnings  exceed her/his consumption,  ie. it leads to
a net resource outflow from the child.
The above discussion also suggests  the following:
(i)  Because of the appearance  of X on the right hand side of (9), the nature of the
inequality would change over the expenditure  distribution. In other words, as
X increases, child labour will at some point cease to be 'exploitative' in the
above sense.
(ii)  (9) can be rearranged  to yield the following:
0 '<1  according as:
X,  (WcTc -PcSc)+(+'S-+c2T*)  (1~~~(I0)
(10) yields the following cut off point for aggregate  household expenditure  when the resource
flow from the child changes direction.
(I  (w_  Tc  _  pCS  )+  (+1 S  _  2W  T* _Wj
(4c  - c )
= (1-fc)wcT:  -PCSC  +±(44S-PcwmT,  *CwfTf  )  (1  1)
(11) suggests that the authorities could influence the cut off expenditures as follows. By
providing better schools, recreational facilities and/or improved child care, the authorities
increase t_, namely, the minimum non-labour time required by the child, thus, lowering T,*
and, hence, reducing the cut off point at which child labour ceases to be 'exploitive'  in the
sense discussed above.
195.  Summary  and Conclusions
This paper proposes and applies a simple test of the hypothesis that there is a positive
association between child labour hours and household poverty. Such a hypothesis, referred to
as the 'Luxury Axiom' by Basu and Van (1998) and seen to play a key role in their analysis,
is based on the idea of parental altruism, namely, that adults send children to work only if the
income from non child labour falls to very low levels. We extend this idea to the context of
children's education to imply a negative association between years of child schooling and
household poverty. In other words, parents will reduce the schooling of their children if the
household's adult earnings fall below the poverty line.
Both these hypotheses were tested on the household survey data sets of Peru and
Pakistan. These countries were chosen because, besides consistency between their data sets
with respect to various definitions, sources, etc. because of the LSMS involvement in each
case, these country samples differ substantially  in some key socio economic  and demographic
characteristics.  For example, at sample mean, the share of child earnings in the household's
total earnings is considerably higher in Pakistan then in Peru, but quite the reverse in case of
adult female earnings. Consequently,  we observe from a comparison of poverty rates in the
two countries, based on adult (i.e. non child) and aggregate  eamings, that income from child
labour pull more households out of poverty in Pakistan than in Peru. These data sets provide,
therefore, a  good basis  for a test  of the various hypotheses on child labour and  child
schooling, and allow an interesting comparison  between the results of the two countries.
The hypothesised relationships between child labour and household poverty, and
between child schooling and household poverty are both strongly confirmed by the Pakistan
data on these variables of child behaviour. When a Pakistani household falls into poverty, i.e.
crosses the  poverty line  from  above as  defined over  non  child  household income, it
significantly  and  substantially increases  its  children's  involvement  in  outside,  paid
20employment  by  approximately  500  hours  annually  for  every  child,  just  as  the  "Luxury
Axiom"  predicts.  Such a household is, also, seen to reduce the schooling of its children,  with
the reduction  being  much larger  for Pakistani girls than boys.  In contrast, the  Peruvian data
fails to detect any significant  association  either between household  poverty  and child labour,
or  between  household  poverty  and  child  schooling.  While  any  attempted  explanation  for
these  asymmetric  results  between  the  two  countries  must,  pending  further  research,  be
speculative,  the results  do point  to the lack of good  schools  in Pakistan,  compared  to  Peru,
and the  discount that  Pakistani  parents  place on the  value and  relevance  of their children's
education.  Consequently,  when  a household falls  into poverty  in Pakistan,  parents  withdraw
their children,  especially  the girls, from schooling  and  send them  to paid  employment.  This
does not happen  in Peru, or at least to the  same extent, because  of a more positive  parental
attitude  towards  children's  education  there.  Moreover,  as  others  have  recently  observed,
Peruvian  children  combine  employment  with schooling,  quite unlike Pakistani  children.  Our
results  on  Pakistani  child  labour  are  consistent  with  the  views  expressed  by  several
commentators  that  the provision  of  good  schools  can do  a  lot  in  reducing  child  labour  in
South Asia and in breaking  the strong link that exists there between  poverty  and child labour
hours. While the relationships  that have been estimated here are pure reduced  form equations,
the  present  results  point  to  the  need  to  model  and  analyse  child  employment  and  child
schooling  simultaneously  in  future  work  - see  Rosenzweig  and  Evenson  (1977)  for  an
example of such an exercise.
The Peruvian and Pakistani estimates also differ on the responsiveness  of child  labour
hours  to  changes  in  adult  wages.  In Peru,  rising adult  male  wages  significantly  reduce  the
labour hours of girl child labour, while in Pakistan rising adult female wages have a large and
significantly  positive  impact  on  girl labour hours.  The close  complementarity  witnessed  in
Pakistan  between  the girl child and  adult female  labour markets  does not appear to hold  for
21others, thus, confirming  that the nature of these relationships  vary between  child/adult sexes
and between countries.
Both  countries  agree  on  the positive  role that  increasing  adult  education,  especially
mother's  education,  can play  in  influencing  child  labour  and  child  schooling.  It  is  worth
recalling  that the size and  significance of the impact of adult education  on both child  labour
and  child  schooling  are  considerably  higher  in  Pakistan  than  in  Peru.  This  points  to  the
important role that adult education can play in Pakistan in improving  child welfare. The adult
female  in  Pakistan  is, on  average,  much  less  educated  than  her  counterpart  in  Peru  and,
consequently,  values education  for her child less than the Peruvian parent. This, coupled  with
the  lack of good  schools  and satisfactory  child  care in  Pakistan  noted  earlier,  explains  the
validity  of the Luxury  Axiom  and the close  complementarity  between  the adult  female  and
girl  child  labour  markets  seen  in  Pakistan,  unlike  in  Peru.  This  sets  up  a  vicous
intergenerational  cycle of educational  backwardness  in Pakistan  where the lack of education
and  skills  of one  generation  cause  the next  to remain  uneducated  and  unskilled  as well.  A
large  and sustained  investment  in adult  education  and schooling  infrastructure  is a necessary
condition for this cycle to be broken.
Child labour, however  undesirable,  is still an undeniable  reality in several developing
countries.  Until  recently,  the  issue  did not  figure  in  the  empirical  analysis  of household
behaviour.  Traditional  models  of equivalence  scales  [see, for  example,  Ray  (1983)]  have
concentrated  exclusively  on the issue  of "costs  of a child"  rather than  the "cost  to a child".
Child labour is a good example of how misplaced such an emphasis  can be. Given its obvious
policy importance,  as more  data sets of the sort used here become  available, the  analysis  of
child labour will attract more attention than it has done so far.
The differences  between  the  nature  of child  labour  in Peru  and Pakistan,  especially
with  respect  to  the  interaction  between  child  and  adult  labour  markets,  merits  closer
22examination in further research involving these and other data sets. Moreover, it is important
to also look at child labour from the demand side using industry level data. There is currently
an imbalance in favour of the supply side in the existing literature. There is also a need to
investigate the impact of child employment on child health, since very little evidence exists
on the issue. The LSMS data sets ought to provide information on child health for older
children, i.e. beyond those aged 6 years, for such an investigation  to be possible.
The  complete elimination of child labour overnight is  neither feasible nor  even
desirable, especially in view of the non trivial share of child labour earnings in household
income. In Pakistan, for example, 3 per cent of households  will continue to live in poverty if
children did not contribute to the household income. Simplistic solutions like ban on child
labour or international trade sanctions will merely drive the employed children from the
formal to the informal sector where they are less open to scrutiny and protection from the
worst effects of employment.
23Table 1: Participation  Rates (in percentages)
of Peruvian Children  in Employment  and in Schooling
Employment  Schooling Age  Boys  Girls  Overall  Boys  Girls  Overall
6  7.9  11.6  9.6  90.5  89.3  89.9
7  12.9  11.8  12.4  93.1  94.6  93.8
8  17.6  11.6  14.3  95.5  95.9  95.7
9  18.5  17.1  17.8  98.1  99.5  98.8
10  29.4  22.1  25.8  97.2  97.1  97.2
11  31.8  21.7  27.0  98.3  96.7  97.5
12  37.7  27.0  32.2  95.5  94.8  95.1
13  32.0  27.3  29.5  96.1  88.1  91.9
14  48.7  32.4  40.6  89.3  90.1  89.7
15  51.8  32.7  42.2  88.2  83.2  85.7
16  46.1  34.9  40.4  82.7  74.4  78.5
17  57.1  27.9  42.6  63.9  58.7  61.3
ALL  31.8  22.7  27.3  90.9  89.0  90.0
Table 2: Participation  Rates (in percentages)
of Pakistani Children  in Employment  and in Schooling
Age  Employment  Schooling
Age________  Boys  Girls  Overall  Boys  Girls  Overall
10  14.9  18.7  16.7  77.3  51.1  64.5
11  16.1  19.6  17.7  82.2  54.8  69.6
12  25.4  22.8  24.2  73.5  49.0  62.4
13  30.3  21.3  25.6  72.1  45.3  58.1
14  36.3  28.3  32.2  66.8  39.0  52.6
15  39.8  29.8  35.0  56.9  33.4  45.7
16  51.2  26.7  39.0  50.7  28.1  39.4
17  48.4  25.8  38.9  48.8  28.2  40.1
ALL  31.3  23.9  27.8  67.2  42.2  55.2
24Table 3: Comparable  Characteristics  at Sample Mean
Peru  Pakistan
1.  Number of children in the household  3.84  5.61
2.  Ratio of girls to boys  0.51  0.48
3.  Percentage of children living in households  below the poverty linea  30.42 (boys)  27.11 (boys)
29.37 (girls)  25.57 (girls)
4.  Ratio of the 'most educated' female's educational  experienceb  to that  0.89  0.39
of the 'most educated' male in the household
5.  Ratio of the child's to the adult male's educational  experienceb  0.64  0.68
6.  Ratio of the child's to the adult female's educational  experienceb  0.72  1.75
7.  Average age of child  11.38  13.16
8.  Percentage  of households that are female  headed  13.17  1.87
9.  Percentage  of children  living in households with electricity  61.33  95.74
10.  Percentage  of children  living in urban areas  59.50  53.67
11.  Ratio of child labour  hours to that of adult  male  .12  .13
12.  Ratio of child labour  hours to that of adult female  .25  .60
13.  Percentage of children involved in some child labour  26.27  23.36
14.  Percentage of children  who have not experienced any schooling  13.62  31.92
aThe  poverty line was set at 50% of the sample median of per adult equivalent  non child household income.
b Measured in years of schooling.
Table 4: Share, at Samplea  Mean, of Household Earningsb
Due to Male, Female and Child
Household  Member  Peru  Pakistan
Adult Male Share  0.745  0.853
(0.325)  (0.251)
Adult Female Share  0.239  0.088
(0.319)  (0.193)
Child Share  0.016  0.059
(0.076)  (0.161)
a  The sample consists  of 2873 households in Peru, and 3720 households  in Pakistan.
b Figures in brackets denote standard deviation.
25Table 5: Regression Estimatesa of Child Labour Supply Equations in Peru
Variable  Coefficient Estimate Variable  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Boys  Girls
Constant  -3439.6a  -2847.0"
(448.65)  (508.84)
Child Characteristics
Age of Child  28 9.49d  288.79d
(71.81)  (81.45)
(Age of Child) 2 -3.38  -6.31
(2.99)  (3.43)
Child Wage  484.92  433.50
(52.32)  (64.32)
Family Characteristics
Poverty Status  -58.63  -92.92
(1, if below poverty line, 0, otherwise)  (76.68)  (84.65)
Region of Residence  -843.28d  992.09d
(1 = urban, 0 = rural)  (93.16)  (106.46)
Number of Children  50.93d  13.92
(17.21)  (20.73)
Number of Adults  12.56  -29.27
(27.60)  (31.67)
Gender of Household Head  -15.19  72.72
(0 = male, 1 = female)  (100.96)  (115.04)
Age of Household Head  1.62  3.34
(3.17)  (3.42)
Male Education  -21.70d  -17.09
(8.06)  (9.26)
Female Education  -22.1  od  -24.27o
(8.29)  (10.08)
.......  .continued  on next page
26Table 5 (Continued)
Coefficient Estimate Variable V ariable____________________________________  _  .Boys  Girls
Family Characteristics
Male Wage  -43.97  -112.42
(38.08)  (28.49)
Female  Wageb  -16.12  -18.13
(28.45)  (27.29)
(Male Wage)2 -2.08  1.74)
(3.41)  (.60)
(Female Wage)2 0.69  0.21
(0.82)  (0.53)
Community  Characteristics  d
Water  Storage  36.76  -70.3
(I  = best, 6 = worst)  (19.31)  (21.97)
Disposal  of Sewerage  111.03d  119.52d
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (22.51)  (25.64)
Electricity  -198.86c  -151.80
(1 = yes, 0 = no)  (90.27)  (101.62)
Joint Tests
Community  Variables  X2 = 47.3 d  2=  28 .52d
a Standard  Errors in brackets
b  In case of households with more than one working male and/or one working female, we take the maximum
wage earned  by them as a measure of the male and female wage, respectively.
c Significant at 5% level.
d Significant  at 1% level.
27Table 6: Regression Estimatesa of Child Labour Supply Equations  in Pakistan
Variable  Coefficient Estimate Boys  Girls
Constant  -8769.40  -9986.00"
(2108.08)  (2734.75)
Child Characteristics
Age of Child  883.09d  732.07
(311.79)  (411.55)
(Age of Child) 2 -18.02  -21.17
(11.45)  (15.35)
Child  Wage  87.88d  138 .05d
(10.80)  (23.60)
Family Characteristics
Poverty Status  491.63d  472.51
(1, if below poverty line, 0, otherwise)  (125.91)  (172.85)
Region of Residence  -480.75d  -288.99
(1 = urban, 0 = rural)  (136.56)  (188.69)
Number of Children  -11.75  -35.30
(20.13)  (27.13)
Number of Adults  -46.68  -57.91
(30.50)  (39.08)
Gender of Household Head  -221.34  -511.90
(0 = male, 1 = female)  (361.19)  (509.51)
Age of Household  Head  0.50  16.32d
(4.47)  (6.00)
Male Education  -74.42d  75.44d
(12.21)  (16.61)
Female Education  -77.41  d  -96.94d
(17.12)  (25.61)





Male Wage'  5.77  -11.28
(10.10)  (14.06)
Female  Wageb  1.85  124.56d
(14.97)  (18.66)
(Male Wage)2 -.17  .20
(.14)  (.20)
(Female  Wage)2 .02  _,.god
(.26)  (.40)
Community  Characteristics
Water  Storage  113.57d  23.38
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (30.41)  (39.43)
Disposal  of Sewerage  -286.14d  348.57d
(1 = best, 6 =  worst)  (53.75)  (76.08)
Electricity  235.34  679.71c
(1 = yes, 0  no)  (233.59)  (317.03)
Joint Tests
Community  Variables  2  d  2  d
a Standard  Errors in brackets
b In case of households with more than one working male and/or one working female, we take the maximum
wage earned by them as a measure of the male and female wage, respectively.
Significant at 5% level.
d Significant  at 1% level.
29Table 7: Sensitivity  of Regression Estimatesa of Girl Labour Supply Equation in
Pakistanto the Inclusion of Domestic Work in Child Labour
Coefficient Estimate
Variable  Domestic Hours  Domestic Hours
Included  Excluded
Constant  -3550.2d  -9986.00a
(1236.79)  (2734.75)
Child Characteristics
Age of Child  581.32d  732.07
(185.56)  (411.55)
(Age of Child) 2 -13.98c  -21.17
(6.98)  (15.35)
Child Wage  56.28d  13 8.05d
(14.89)  (23.60)
Family Characteristics
Poverty Status  59.55  472.5
(1, if below poverty line, 0, otherwise)  (83.88)  (172.85)
Region of Residence  -254.28d  -288.99
(1 = urban, 0 = rural)  (86.68)  (188.69)
Number of Children  -8.33  -35.30
(12.18)  (27.13)
Number of Adults  -107.54d  -57.91
(16.93)  (39.08)
Gender of Household  Head  -304.15  -511.90
(0 = male, 1 = female)  (232.64)  (509.51)
Age of Household Head  2.70  16.32d
(2.81)  (6.00)
Male Education  -14.08  75.44d
(7.26)  (16.61)
Female Education  -57.60d  -96.94d
(9.47)  (25.61)
.......  .continued  on next page
30Table 7 (Continued)
Coefficient Estimate
Variable  Domestic Hours  Domestic Hours
Included  Excluded
Family Characteristics
Male Wage  -3.78  -11.28
(6.00)  (14.06)
Female  Wageb  20.24c  124.56d
(9.38)  (18.66)
(Male Wage)2 .071  .20
(.083)  (.20)
(Female  Wage)2 -.321  -1.90d
(.205)  (.40)
Community Characteristics
Water  Storage  7.39  23.38
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (18.52)  (39.43)
Disposal  of Sewerage  83.56c  348.57d
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (33.35)  (76.08)
Electricity  -193.56  679.71c
(1  yes, 0 = no)  (151.85)  (317.03)
Joint Tests
Community Variables  X32 = 10.394c  %2 = 26.75d
a Standard  Errors in brackets
b  In case of households with more than one working male and/or one working female, we take the maximum
wage earned by them as a measure of the male and female wage,  respectively.
c Significant  at 5% level.
d Significant  at 1% level.
31Table 8: Regression  Estimatesa of Child Schooling Equations  in Peru
Variable  Coefficient  Estimate Boys  Girls
Constant  -5.38"  5.99a
(.88)  (.95)
Child Characteristics
Age of Child  0.98d  1.08d
(.15)  (.15)
(Age of Child) 2 -0.011  _. 01 8d
(.01)  (.01)
Child Wage  -.204  -.122
(.13)  (.17)
Family Characteristics
Poverty Status  -.175  .220
(1, if below poverty line, 0, otherwise)  (.17)  (.17)
Region of Residence  .018  -.023
(1 = urban, 0 = rural)  (.21)  (.21)
Number  of Children  -.095c  _.098c
(.04)  (.04)
Number of Adults  -.162d  -.068
(.06)  (.06)
Gender of Household Head  -.165  .083
(0= male, I = female)  (.21)  (.21)
Age of Household  Head  .007  .005
(.01)  (.01)
Male Education  .040c  .050d
(.02)  (.02)
Female Education  .047d  .049d
(.02)  (.02)
.......  .continued  on next page
32Table 8 (Continued)
Variable  Coefficient Estimate
Boys  Girls
Family Characteristics
Male Wage'  .005  .002
(.03)  (.04)
Female  Wageb  .003  .046
(.05)  (.04)
(Male Wage) 2 .000012  -.00016
(.00)  (.00)
(Female Wage)2 .00029  -.0010
(.00)  (.00)
Community Characteristics
Water  Storage  -.027  -.047
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (.04)  (.05)
Disposal  of Sewerage  -.066  -.075
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (.05)  (.05)
Electricity  .327  .517c
(1 = yes, 0 = no)  (.21)  (.21)
Joint Tests
Community  Variables  2=  7.12  2=14.82d
a  Standard  Errors in brackets
b In case of households with more than one working male and/or one working female, we take the maximum
wage earned by them as a measure of the male and female wage, respectively.
c Significant  at 5% level.
d Significant  at 1% level.
33Table 9: Regression  Estimatesa of Child Schooling Equations  in Pakistan
Coefficient Estimate Variable  Boys  Girls
Constant  -7.55a  -11.1919
(2.54)  (3.57)
Child Characteristics
Age of Child  0.975c  1.690d
(0.38)  (0.54)
(Age of Child) 2 -0.018  -.056d
(.014)  (.020)
Child Wage  -0.194d  -.166d
(.023)  (.055)
Family Characteristics
Poverty Status  0.476  -1.26
(1, if below poverty line, 0, otherwise)  (.169)  (.25)
Region of Residence  -.258  .662d
(1 = urban, 0 = rural)  (.176)  (.251)
Number of Children  .052c  .010
(.025)  (.035)
Number of Adults  -.174d  .304d
(.037)  (.049)
Gender of Household Head  .828  1.954d
(0 = male, 1 = female)  (.473)  (.630)
Age of Household Head  .005  .009
(.006)  (.008)
Male Education  .2S9d  .296d
(.015)  (.021)
Female Education  .152d  .367d
(.019)  (.025)
.......  .continued  on next page
34Table 9 (Continued)
Coefficient  Estimate
Variable  Boys  Girls
Family Characteristics
Male Wage'  .014  .015
(.012)  (.017)
Female Wageb  .015  _ 072d
(.020)  (.028)
(Male Wage)2 .000  .000
(.000)  (.000)
(Female Wage)2 -.001  .001
(.00)  (.00)
Community Characteristics
Water  Storage  -.097c  1 88d
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (.039)  (.055)
Disposal  of Sewerage  .062  _ 596d
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (.069)  (.094)
Electricity  1.002d  .668
(I  = yes, 0  no)  (.313)  (.494)
Joint Tests  %2  = 19.6 0 3 = 75.86
Community  Variables
a Standard  Errors in brackets
b In case of households with more than one working male and/or one working female, we take the maximum
wage earned  by them as a measure of the male and female wage, respectively.
c Significant  at 5% level.
d Significant  at 1% level.
35Table  10: Coefficient Estimatesa of Earnings Share Equations
Variable  Coefficient Estimate
Adult Male  Adult Female  Child
Constant  .846'  .0932"  0607"
(.025)  (.020)  (.018)
Family  Characteristics
Poverty Status  -.183d  .0725d
(1, if below poverty line, 0, otherwise)  (.009)  (.007)  (.007)
Region of Residence  .003  -.013  .010
(1 = urban, 0 = rural)  (.009)  (.007)  (.007)
Gender  of Household  Head  -. 3 4 4d  ,3 0 5 d  .039c
(0 = male, 1 = female)  (.025)  (.031)  (.018)
Age of Household  head  .0002  -.0003  .0001
(.0002)  (.0003)  (.0002)
Male Education  .0051  d-.0036  -.0015d
(.0008)  (.0006)  (.0005)
Female Education  -.0017  0049d  .0032d
(.001)  (.0008)  (.0007)
Wages
Male Wageb  -.0018  0.0001
(.0002)  (.0002)  (.0002)
Female Wageb  -.0106d  .0103d  .0003
(.0004)  (.0004)  (.0003)
Child Wage  b  0 0 10 9 d  -.0012  .0 1 21d
(.0009)  (.0007)  (.0006)
Community Characteristics
Water Storage  -.0017  -.0008  .0024
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (.002)  (.002)  (.0016)
Disposal of Sewerage  .0049  -.0001  -.0048
(1 = best, 6 = worst)  (.003)  (.003)  (.0026)
Electricity  .0123  .0014  -.0137
(1 = yes, 0 = no)  (.017)  (.013)  (.018)
Joint  Tests
Community Variables  X3  = 2.48  X  = 0.26  X3  = 6.18
Standard  Errors  in brackets
b In case  of households  with  more  than  one  working  male and/or  one working  female  and/or  one working  child,
we  take the maximum  wage  earned  by them  as a measure  of the male,  female  and  child  wage,  respectively.
C  Significant  at 5%  level.
d Significant  at 1%  level.
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